“Reader, I Detained Him Under the Mental Health Act”: A Literary Response to Professor Fennell’s Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder by Gurnham, David
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
‘‘Reader, I Detained Him Under the Mental Health
Act’’: A Literary Response to Professor Fennell’s Best
Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder
David Gurnham
Published online: 19 July 2008
 The Author(s) 2008
Abstract This is a response to Professor Fennell’s paper on the recent inﬂuence
and impact of the best interests test on the treatment of patients detained under the
Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) for mental disorder. I discuss two points of general
ethical signiﬁcance raised by Professor Fennell. Firstly, I consider his argument on
the breadth of the best interests test, incorporating as it does factors considerably
wider than those of medical justiﬁcations and the risk of harm. Secondly, I discuss
his contention that the apparent permeability of the line between the interests of the
patient and the interests of society is something to be concerned about in itself.
Since the overarching theme of the paper is the proper place of social and cultural
values, my reponse considers the implications of Fennell’s arguments in the light of
Charlotte Bronte ¨’s novel ‘Jane Eyre’, which, through the character of Bertha Mason
(the infamous ‘mad woman in the attic’) provides a provocative study of the
relationship between mental disorder and society.
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Introduction
For evidence that the best interests test and the paternalism that underpins it—once
the undisputed king of medical decision-making—is now thoroughly unfashionable,
one need only look at the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). The legislation is so-
called in order to present itself in alignment with currently much more favourable
principles such as autonomy, even though it deals largely with patients’ incapacity
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of its way to formulate the test in such a way as to promote autonomy as far as
possible, reminding medical practitioners that patients who struggle to understand,
retain, weigh and use a doctor’s advice (who would formerly have been assumed to
be straightforwardly incompetent) are not the mute subjects of King best interests,
but citizens within a participatory democracy. Patients themselves are given a role
in the best interests assessment, both in fact where possible and through a watered
down form of substituted judgment where it is not. Professor Fennell’s paper traces
the line in English law on treating mental health patients that, at least formally,
separates the broad best interests test for incompetent patients under MCA 2005 and
the tests for the detention and treatment of patients without their consent who pose a
risk to self and/or others for ‘mental disorder’ under the Mental Health Act 1983 and
2007 (MHA): to come into force October 2008. Although the MCA is explicitly
excluded from consideration when a patient is detained under the MHA, it has
somehow got in through the back door. Professor Fennell argues that best interests
reasoning has widened an already worryingly broad range of reasons for justifying
treating patients treated for mental disorder, increasing the decision-making power
for the medical practitioner over the patient. In this response piece I would like to
focus upon two lines of thought that may be developed from Professor Fennell’s
paper. The ﬁrst is the question of the interpretation of the legal test for justiﬁed
treatment without consent under the MHA and the extent to which best interests
reasoning makes a positive or negative contribution. The second is the role of the
medical practitioner him/herself in relation to exercising decision-making powers
under the law and the strength of Professor Fennell’s criticism that the best interests
test unjustly allows the practitioner’s own social and cultural values to determine
their decisions. Imposing something of my own social and cultural attitudes on this
discussion, I shall illustrate my own response with reference to Charlotte Bronte ¨’s
Jane Eyre.
The (un)Welcome Presence of Best Interests and the Meaning of ‘Appropriate’
Part IV of the MHA 1983 provides that treatments may be given without the detained
patient’s consent, whether in emergency situations (s.62) or other types of situation
for mental disorder, some of which require a second opinion (s.58) and others that do
not (s.63), in order to safeguard the life or health of that patient, or that of others.
Professor Fennell worries that in the instance of s.63 at least, decided case-law shows
that, far from merely allowing routine and strictly necessary activity of mental health
practitioners to take place without unnecessary legal impediment, the MHA has
been, and will increasingly be, interpreted to justify treatment in terms so broad as to
cause concern. In all cases, the test to be applied under the MHA is that the proposed
treatment will ‘alleviate or prevent deterioration in the patient’s condition’.
However, in ﬂeshing out this notion, the courts seem to have become dissatisﬁed
with considering this question as separate to that of the patient’s best interests—i.e.
reasoning imported from the explicitly excluded MCA. For Professor Fennell, since
‘best interests’ is itself so broad a concept, courts’ increasing acceptance of the
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treatment in the interests of society—a troublingly vague basis on which to make so
serious a decision for the patient in question. Two cases that point to this
convergence of the MHA and MCA are Tameside and GlossopAcute Services Trust v
CH
1 (use of reasonable force on a schizophrenic woman to secure delivery of her
baby by caesarean section) and R (on the application of N) vD rM
2 (obligation to
consider patient’s best interests as well as medical necessity in approving treatment).
The relevance of these cases here is the extent to which best interests reasoning
can or should be distinguished from that of medical necessity under the MHA. The
formal legal division becomes clearer when we consider cases that fall under the
scope of best interests. There is a long and now familiar and largely uncontroversial
line of case-law that is usually traced to the House of Lords decision of Re F (adult
sterilisation)
3 that underscores the position that an incompetent patient may be
treated without their consent in their best interests, a procedure now codiﬁed in the
MCA. These judgments are authoritative in the case of patients who are not detained
under the MHA. To be treated in one’s best interests under the MCA, a patient does
not have to be suffering from a ‘mental disorder’ as it is deﬁned under s.1(2) of the
MHA,
4 but from any ‘mental disability’ which prevents them from taking the
relevant decision for themselves. According to Professor Fennell, the fact that ‘best
interests’ reasoning has ‘become relevant’ to MHA cases also, ‘serves to extend
clinical discretion which is already wide as a result of the broad deﬁnition of
treatment for mental disorder, by extending beyond the medical the range of
interests which may be served by treatment without consent’.
5 As a bald fact, this
must be true: the Court of Appeal has often stressed that best interests incorporates
considerations far wider than the medical. Lord Justices have taken a balance sheet
approach to assessing best interests, and the ‘balancing exercise’ of beneﬁts and
burdens which may incorporate considerations of the patient’s health, welfare,
emotional needs, family arrangements and care provisions, etc.
6 The implication is
that, unlike the supposedly stricter conﬁnes of the MHA, there is nothing
particularly ruled out of consideration in an assessment of a patient’s best interests.
Is there a good reason for seeking to exclude best interests from MHA cases? For
Professor Fennell, this is a question of the breadth of power to be handed to the
1 [1996] 1 FLR 762, FD.
2 [2002] EWCA Civ 1789.
3 [1990] 2 AC 1.
4 s.1(2): ‘‘Mental disorder’ means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind,
psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind.’ The Mental Health Act 2007 will
replace this deﬁnition (from October 2008) with this rather more general phrase: ‘‘mental disorder’ means
any disorder or disability of the mind’.
5 P. Fennell, ‘Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder’ in this issue. Due to editorial and
printing restrictions beyond the author’s control, references to Professor Fennell’s paper do not specify
page numbers.
6 See, for example, Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15, in which Thorpe LJ stated that the
test ‘embraces issues far wider than the medical’ (30) and Dame Butler-Sloss P that it incorporated
‘broader ethical, social moral and welfare considerations’ (27). The latter has also ruled that best interests
is to be ‘interpreted more broadly than ‘medical interests’ and include emotional and other factors’ Re L
(Medical Treatment: Beneﬁt) [2004] EWHC 2713 (Fam) para [12].
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7 (the ‘Bournewood’ decision) the
European Court of Human Rights drew a clear distinction between the two legal
frameworks in terms of the treatment of patients and limitations on carers and
medical practitioners. If the requirement that a patient must be ‘detained’ before
non-consensual treatment for mental disorder may be administered is to be
practically effective, surely it should provide some protection for patients from the
much wider best interests test?
What are we to make of the observation that the best interests test incorporates
wider social interests as well as the patients’ own best interests? I think that this
observation needs to be read in conjunction with related comments made at various
points in Fennell’s paper on the breadth of discretion open to mental health
practitioners. On the MHA case of CH,
8 Professor Fennell writes: ‘This case
stretched the concept of treatment for mental disorder to the very limit. It also
revealed the permeability of the boundary between best interests of the patient and
the interests of others’.
9 This seems to imply that case-law has allowed the MHA to
be interpreted so widely that a line has been brought into view—at which the actions
of mental health practitioners could no longer be regarded as ‘treatment for mental
disorder’—which should not be crossed. On the ‘balance-sheet’ character of the best
interests test applied in the courts, Professor Fennell states: ‘Although preferable to
Bolam, the balance-sheet approach with its broad range of interests that may be
taken into account, still leaves considerable discretion with clinicians’.
10 And, why
is the balance sheet approach to be preferred to the Bolam principle (that a decision
should not be deemed unlawful if a responsible body of medical opinion would
support the decision in question)? Although Professor Fennell does not make it
explicitly clear, the answer seems to lie in the breadth of discretion conferred by
Bolam. For instance, at an earlier point in the paper, Professor Fennell argues that
the ‘Bolam principle effectively confers great discretion on clinicians to decide what
treatment may appropriately be given, and its use in guidance to Second Opinion
Appointed Doctors (SOADs) has ensured that a treatment proposal will be denied
approval only in the rarest of circumstances, and that approval is granted to
treatment without signiﬁcant change in 98% of cases’.
11 Does Professor Fennell
mean to say therefore that the balance sheet of beneﬁts and burdens of a course of
action considered in the best interests test is preferable to the Bolam principle since
it provides a means for imposing stricter controls on such decisions? The answer is
unclear, especially since
12 Professor Fennell seems also to suggest that it is the best
interests test and not the Bolam principle that confers the wider discretion on mental
health practitioners: ‘‘Best interests’ has become relevant to decision-making under
Part IV of the MHA 1983, but it serves to extend clinical discretion which is already
wide as a result of the broad deﬁnition of treatment for mental disorder...’ At no
7 [2004] ECHR 45508/99.
8 See note 1 above.
9 Fennell, op cit.
10 Fennell, op cit.
11 Fennell, op cit.
12 Fennell, op cit.
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actually to be excluded from MHA reasoning. In any case, as Professor Fennell
states
13 to rely solely on the Bolam principle to the exclusion of other considerations
(of which the best interests test may be one) in MHA detention and treatment cases
may be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). In other words,
under the HRA, for the MHA to be compatible with patients’ Convention rights
under Article 3 (torture and degrading treatment) and Article 8 (individual
autonomy of personal decisions), the best interests test as it is formulated in MCA
with its emphasis on the involvement of the patient whenever possible means that
best interests would risk violation of these provisions. Best interests reasoning may
therefore have a legitimate place in MHA reasoning, but Fennell’s references to the
‘expansive approach’
14 of the best interests test implies that what he ﬁnds troubling
is the breadth of the discretion itself, and that there are no effective limitations on
clinical discretion. As he concludes ‘In order to comply with the European
Convention the tests of clinical necessity and best interests will have to be applied,
but as we have seen these do not represent a signiﬁcant limitation on clinical
discretion’.
15 Fennell does not argue strongly either for restricting the expansive
discretion he identiﬁes in the MHA case-law or in its defence. The most that I feel I
can say is that it is commented upon as a potential concern, possibly as a basis for
future critique.
Whatever the truth of Professor Fennell’s own feelings, my own view is that
there is no reason to suppose that consideration of the much wider social interests
would be more likely than not to be antagonistic or injurious to the patient’s own
medical interests. I think that in order adequately to uphold patients’ Convention
rights, medical practitioners and courts do need to have access to an interpretive
framework that is wider than merely medical or risk based. The English courts have
not yet held that any part of the MHA permits the treatment for a mental disorder
without consent simply because it is in the best interests of patients or others.
However, the consideration of the patient’s best interests are surely highly relevant
to deciding the narrower question as to medical necessity. Fennell argues that the
case of CH illustrates the ‘permeability of the boundary between the best interests of
the patient and the interests of others’.
16 It is true that the treatment was given ﬁrstly
in order to ensure the safe delivery of the fetus rather than to prevent direct harm to
the patient. However, the Court of Appeal were also careful to emphasise that the
treatment given was necessary to prevent the worsening of her schizophrenia, which
is clearly appropriate to MHA reasoning. The new criteria for s.58 treatments under
the new MHA 2007—that of ‘appropriateness’—is, as Professor Fennell states,
apparently much wider than the 1983 requirement, especially as it is deﬁned in the
new legislation somewhat tautologically as treatment that is ‘appropriate in his case,
taking into account the nature and degree of the mental disorder and all other
13 Fennell, op cit.
14 Fennell, op cit.
15 Fennell, op cit.
16 Fennell, op cit.
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17 The very general justiﬁcation for s.58 treatment does
seem to be an invitation for best-interests-type reasoning, and so the vast body of
existing best interests case-law in the Court of Appeal will be a helpful interpretive
tool.
It is in the context of establishing when treatment is ‘appropriate’ that the
involvement of best interests may be challenged. Can it be that the best interests is a
test of bad faith, in the Satrean sense of diverting one’s mind from the true purpose
of one’s behaviour? The next section of this response paper deals more fully with
the social and cultural aspects of this question. For now, however, it may be helpful
brieﬂy to consider here the ethical import of the MHA 2007’s use of such an
expression as ‘appropriate’, and the relevance of the very broad social best interests
test that worries Professor Fennell. Mental health and particularly individuals with
mental health problems are a source of some considerable anxiety for policy makers
and also those who comment on policy in this area. In Charlotte Bronte ¨’s Jane Eyre,
ﬁrst published in London in 1847, the passionate and brooding Mr Rochester ﬁnally
confesses that he has for ten years kept his mentally ill wife, Bertha Mason, locked
away in the attic of his stately home of Thornﬁeld. Rochester explains how, as a
rash youth, he was misled into the arranged marriage with a ‘tall, dark and
majestic’
18 Creole woman by a collusion of friends and family who concealed her
true nature from him before the wedding. After a few years of miserable marriage in
the West Indies in which Rochester quickly ﬁnds her to be completely unsuitable as
a wife—’her nature wholly alien to mine, her tastes obnoxious to me, her cast of
mind common, low, narrow and singularly incapable of being led to anything
higher, expanded to anything larger’ (269)—he decides on a course of action that he
explains as done in her own best interests—as appropriate in the full context of her
mental condition. The marriage and subsequent concealment is discovered by Jane
to the latter’s horror. In a crucial scene in which we discover the impressive strength
of Jane Eyre’s commitment to social and legal norms, Rochester attempts to justify
his actions thus:
‘Go’, said Hope, ‘and live in Europe. ... You may take the maniac with you to
England; conﬁne her with due attendance and precautions at Thornﬁeld. ... See
that she is cared for as her condition demands, and you have done all that God
and humanity require of you. ... Place her in safety and comfort: shelter her
degradation with secrecy, and leave her.’ (271–2, abbreviated)
In other words, Rochester treated Bertha’s condition with forced conﬁnement and
concealment from all of society apart from Grace Poole (employed by Rochester to
take care of her needs) in her own best interests. However, Rochester’s view of best
interests is not limited to the interests of the individual. There are of course his own
personal interests—‘I have a right to deliver myself from it if I can. ...—let me break
away, and go home to God!’ (271)—and one also gets the impression that he feels
that his attempted bigamy notwithstanding, he has acted as a representative of
civilised society as a whole. Far away from home in the West Indies, he feels ‘the
17 Mental Health Act 2007, s.4(3)(4).
18 Charlotte Bronte ¨, Jane Eyre, Richard J. Dunn (ed.) (London and New York: Norton, 1971) p. 268.
Health Care Anal (2008) 16:268–278 273
123sweet wind from Europe... whispering in the refreshed leaves’, and he ascribes his
clarity of thought to Wisdom itself, ‘for it was true Wisdom that consoled me in that
hour, and showed me the right path to follow.’ (271) This is what makes his decision
to shut Bertha away forever ‘appropriate’ in a broader sense.
These passages from Jane Eyre give us some idea of what the ethical signiﬁcance
might be of Professor Fennell’s remarking on the ‘permeability’ of the boundary
between the interests of the patient and the interests of society in MHA case-law.
19
In terms of deciding in the interests of the patient alone, the best interests test may
be a test of bad faith, since whilst it helps us to be assured (or ‘feelgood’, as
Professor Fennell puts it
20) that any treatment given coercively to a non-consenting
patient for a mental disorder is indeed ‘appropriate’ for the patient, it leaves open
the risk that it may be much more appropriate for society as a whole. The
interpretation of the meaning of Bertha Mason’s violence towards herself (she
eventually throws herself from a window in chapter 36) and to others (she tries to
throttle and bite Mr Rochester in chapter 26) cannot exclude social and cultural
values. The incorporation of the word ‘appropriate’ into the test for treatment under
the new legislation is an invitation to critically reﬂect on the role of social
constructions of best interests. Ethical critique of the recent case-law and future
developments of mental health policy should be directed not towards the exclusion
of cultural and social aspects of the best interests test, but rather to ﬁnding a positive
and mutually complementary place for them.
The Social and Cultural Values of the Decision-Maker
Professor Fennell associates best interests with other concepts capable of affording
divergent meanings. Human dignity, as Fennell points out in the quotation below, is
also invoked without the content of the expression being known or knowable in
advance. Rather, it conveys a feeling that the right thing is being done:
Although ‘best interests’ invokes a ‘feelgood’ response almost on a par with
the related concept of human dignity, decisions on these questions are
profoundly inﬂuenced by the social and cultural values of the decision-maker.
Each idea is capable of justifying divergent conclusion as to what outcome
upholds dignity or best interests.
21
The idea of best interests also shares with human dignity an objective perspective on
what is best for the patient which, in paternalistically displacing the actual or
presumed views of the patient, has the potential for violence. As objective concepts,
both may be (and are) invoked in medical and criminal law to protect a person from
their own self-destructive wishes. Of course, as Professor Fennell argues, decisions
made in a patient’s best interests are not really objective as such (or rather, few
would believe them to be so), but the decision-maker’s own professional judgment,
19 P. Fennell, op cit.
20 Fennell, op cit.
21 Fennell, op cit.
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‘best interests’ decisions will vary according to the decision-maker’s personal
attitudes. The MCA goes into some depth in stipulating how the best interests of a
patient are to be determined: who to ask, what aspects of the patient’s family and
personal life to take into account, etc. However, the statute does not deﬁne best
interests itself, as what is in any given patient’s best interests is dependent upon the
precise circumstances of his predicament. It must be true that this leaves some
considerable scope for interpretation by the medical decision-maker. Again, Fennell
does not make himself explicitly clear on critical implications of the relationship he
identiﬁes between the ‘‘feelgood’ response’ (i.e. claiming universal approval)
invoked by best interests and the room that this makes for the ‘profound inﬂuence’
of a decision-maker’s ‘social and cultural values’. However, given my earlier
interpretation of his comments on the best interests test as critical as opposed to
merely descriptive of the ‘expansive approach’ of the best interests balance sheet
approach, I cannot read this statement without reading into it an implied suggestion
that the opportunity for, as Professor Fennell puts it in the very last line of his paper,
‘justifying a broad range of compulsory interventions in the name of treatment for
mental disorder’
22 is a reason at least to be a little worried about it.
However, as I think Professor Fennell would accept, this can only be the very
start of a critique of the law. The mere fact that assessments of best interests are
‘profoundly inﬂuenced by the social and cultural values of the decision-maker’
cannot in itself be grounds for critique, and nor do I think Professor Fennell wants to
suggest otherwise. Professor Fennell has demonstrated in his paper that the very
deﬁnition of mental disorder is itself open to social and cultural interpretation,
depending on the risk of a mental condition to manifest in violence and physical
harm. Criminal lawyers have long been acutely aware of the difﬁculties that law’s
concern to limit and control violent behaviour has posed for the relationship
between law and mental health. For example, a ﬁnding that a defendant was insane
when he committed an act of violence allows the court to order indeﬁnite detention
in a secure mental hospital. Lord Denning’s well-known deﬁnition of a ‘disease of
the mind’ for the purposes of the insanity defence is generally accepted as having
very little to do with medicine as such: ‘any mental disorder which has manifested
itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind’.
23 The reason why
Lord Denning’s deﬁnition survives is because it is recognised that, although
medically meaningless, it serves the law’s purpose—that of controlling violence and
physical harm. Professor Fennell has similarly shown how certain cases on
detention and treatment under the MHA have ‘stretched the concept of treatment for
mental disorder to the very limit’, adopting a ﬂexible approach to mental disorder in
order to allow medical practitioners to perform operations and treatments they think
necessary. But if the raison d’etre of the mental health legislation is to deal with
violent or harmful individuals, the limit of treatment for mental disorder will be
determined, not by medically defendable deﬁnitions of mental disorder as such, but
by prosaic legal imperatives. To borrow from the vocabulary of human rights
22 Fennell, op cit.
23 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 410.
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frame in mental health might be described as a legitimate aim in controlling the risk
of harm that stems from abnormal behaviour stemming from mental disorder.
What should attract the attention of law’s critics therefore, is not the fact that
decision-makers are inﬂuenced by social and cultural values, but rather the law’s
claim to be legitimately pursuing the aim of controlling violence manifests itself in
particular cases and the implications this has for principles of medical ethics, such
as the rights of the patient. If decision-makers are permitted to treat without consent
without speciﬁc risks of harm being identiﬁed, the claim to be pursuing a particular
necessary end starts to look weaker. In Professor Fennell’s paper, the case of CH,
cited above, is one such example, since although there was evidence of a risk of
harm to the pregnant patient as a result of her schizophrenia, it is unlikely that the
force used to deliver her baby by caesarean section would have been thought
necessary had the decision-maker not brought particular social and cultural attitudes
towards fetal welfare to the issue. Charlotte Bronte ¨’s depiction of an instance of
mental health ‘treatment’ in the nineteenth century also gives us an opportunity to
reﬂect on the ethical implications of deﬁning mental disorder according to social
and cultural values. In support of his view that Bertha Mason was a ‘lunatic’
requiring incarceration, Mr Rochester says:
[H]er vices sprang up fast and rank: they were so strong, only cruelty could
check them, and I would not use cruelty. What a pigmy intellect she had, and
what giant propensities! How fearful were the curses those propensities
entailed on me! Bertha Mason, the true daughter of an infamous mother,
dragged me though all the hideous and degrading agonies which must attend a
man bound to a wife at once intemperate and unchaste. (269–70)
Mr Rochester is no medical expert, but as a gentleman in nineteenth century
England and a man of the world [he has travelled across the world and lived,
‘sometimes in St Petersburg, oftener in Paris; occasionally in Rome, Naples and
Florence’ (273)] he is an authority on what is acceptable and what is unacceptable
behaviour for a society lady. Mr Rochester ﬁnds that Bertha Mason’s madness stems
from a mental disorder inherited from her ‘infamous mother’, but from the
perspective of a reader outside of nineteenth century society it looks as if the rage
and fury that Bertha displays later in life arise instead from a lifetime of being
imprisoned for her refusal to conform to patriarchal notions of an obedient, well-
mannered and faithful wife. This is not the place for detailed psychological analysis,
nor for a discussion of the gender-political questions of power and control of women
or difference. However, what is important to note for this discussion on the role of
‘best interests’, is that when Mr Rochester decided that the drastic action of shutting
her away was necessary, it seems to have been a decision-based as much on social
and cultural factors as psychological ones. He complains of the injury her ‘impure,
depraved’ character did to his self-respect and social standing: ‘society associated
my name and person with hers’ (270). He complains that ‘no professed harlot ever
had a fouler vocabulary than she’, and that her ‘wolﬁsh cries’ (presumably in protest
at having been shut up) woke him at night (271).
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implications of his cautionary note about the incorporation of social and cultural
values into MHA decisions. But there is certainly an ethical question to be posed
here. If there really is, as Fennell implies, a blurring of the line between social/
cultural values and the medical question of risks and harms, could modern patients
be vulnerable the kind of violation of liberty portrayed by Charlotte Bronte ¨? I have
interpreted Professor Fennel to have suggested in his paper that the nature of best
interests as a ‘feelgood’ or ‘portmanteau’ concept means that we have cause to
worry about the kinds of decisions—socially and culturally diverse as they
consequently are—that mental health practitioners make for patients. If there is
indeed cause for concern about this, it is necessary to take a critical view of the
kinds of social and cultural values that inform and inﬂuence decision-making, and
the way in which this takes place. Reading literature is one way of developing such
a critical attitude to decision-making processes. For instance, the depiction of the
treatment of mental disorder in Jane Eyre must be read in the context of prevailing
attitudes towards mental illness and patients’ rights in the nineteenth century, in
which medical paternalism really was king. Mr Rochester’s treatment of Bertha
Mason reﬂects, not just the idiosyncratic views of one character, but an historically
speciﬁc attitude towards mental health and mental disorder. Therefore, what is
signiﬁcant is not that individual medical practitioners should be prevented from
making detention and treatment decisions in the light of their own social and
cultural values, but that the legal framework itself reﬂects a set of values that are
sound guiding principles for decision-making. Although today’s best interests test is
undoubtedly paternalistic, it is only fair to acknowledge that modern medical and
legal culture gives a more central role to the patient than previous conceptions of the
test. If best interests reasoning is to become formally incorporated into MHA
decision-making, then it is possible that the MCA’s emphasis on elements of
substituted judgment (the patient’s past and present wishes, feelings and beliefs) and
measures that medical practitioners are obliged to undertake to encourage patients
as far as possible to be involved in best interests assessments, means that while it is
always possible for broader social and cultural factors to affect the decision as to
whether to treat, patient-centred, autonomy-based values will also exert a
countervailing inﬂuence.
Conclusion
It is quite possible that the trend towards convergence of the tests for treatment
without consent under the MHA and treatment of incompetent patients in their best
interests will continue, especially given the pre-eminence of Convention rights since
the HRA 1998 came into force. Whether or not we will see a formal collapse of the
legal distinction between detention under MHA and treatment in a patient’s best
interests under MCA may depend signiﬁcantly upon developments in the legal
deﬁnition of competence. Under the MHA, a detained individual may be treated
without their consent even if they would not be judged incompetent under s.3 of the
MCA, whereas in the case of patients who are not detained, patients’ own consent is
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Fennell warns that the increasing permeability of the boundary between these two
different legal frameworks allows for a greater range of justiﬁcations for treating
patients without their consent, and thus greater power to the medical decision-
makers to exercise paternalistic judgements and impose their own values and
beliefs. In response, I have argued ﬁrstly that the incorporation of the broader best
interests reasoning may be necessary to protect patients’ Convention rights and
secondly that in our critical engagement with treatment decisions it is the social and
cultural values promoted in the legal sources that should concern us more than the
individual beliefs of medical practitioners. The moves towards recognising the
importance of a patient-centred approach to best interests (as evidenced by the
MCA) provides some cause for optimism.
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